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Abstract:  
In this study, I explore if the timing of credit in the pineapple production cycle 
affects fertilizer use at the first crucial application period in Southern Ghana.  Using 
unique survey data collected at six-week intervals, results of Probit and Tobit models 
suggest that total credit has no effect on fertilizer use, but an additional dollar of credit 
specifically during the time of interest significantly increases the probability of fertilizer 
use by 0.138% and the amount of fertilizer by 0.797%.  Findings suggest that credit 
should be targeted during agronomically important periods for input use in order to 
maximize the effect of credit.   
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I. Introduction:  
 Smallholder farmers in developing economies often struggle to purchase farm 
inputs at the beginning of a production cycle.  Farmers need finance at the start of the 
season, but they do not reap revenue until harvest.  This challenge is especially salient for 
horticulture crops such as pineapple, which takes 18 months to mature, and the timing of 
inputs is crucial for successful production (Conely and Udry, 2010).  Economists have 
criticized government subsidies used to help farmers afford agricultural inputs because 
they introduce inefficiencies into the market and financing them can be unsustainable 
(Morris et. al, 2007).  However, many development economists argue for fertilizer 
subsidies because they can create a positive cycle of growth and lead to self-sufficiency 
for farmers (Dorwad et. al, 2004). Duflo et. al (2011) and Brune et. al (2015) have 
studied other methods to incentivize farmers to use fertilizer, including small, time 
sensitive discounts and commitment savings accounts respectively.  My research 
contributes to this body of literature by analyzing the effect of an analogous, but 
alternative approach to increasing fertilizer use: the proper timing of credit.   
This study seeks to explore if the timing of credit in the pineapple production 
cycle affects the use of fertilizer at the first crucial period of application in Southern 
Ghana.  I utilize a unique data set that includes the timing of fertilizer application and 
borrowing at six-week intervals to control for credit amounts received at various points in 
time in relation to planting.  Results of Probit, Tobit, and OLS models suggest that an 
additional dollar of credit during the important time to apply fertilizer increases the 
probability of fertilizer use by 0.138% and the amount of fertilizer by 0.262% to 0.797%.   
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This paper is structured in ten sections. The next two sections describe relevant 
background information and literature reviewed.  The following sections explain the 
theoretical basis, data, and empirical strategy used for the analysis. Then, I discuss the 
summary statistics and results, and finally I present the limitations and conclusion.  
II. Background Information 
 
Pineapple Production and the Farming System in Southern Ghana  
 
The data for this study comes from the Akwapim South district in Southern 
Ghana, and economists Marcus Goldstein and Chris Udry collected the data from 1996 to 
19981.  Throughout the 1990s, the farming system in the region underwent a transition 
from traditional maize and cassava intercropping to more chemical-intensive pineapple 
production for sale to exporters and urban consumers (Goldstein and Udry, 1999).  
However, pineapple farmers continue to cultivate maize and cassava plots, dispersed 
among pineapple plots.  The entire dataset includes 221 households from four villages, 
and households own a total of 1,280 plots.  In the study villages, 47% of farmers farm 
pineapple (Conley and Udry, 2010), and no village in the sample has more than half of 
the plots cultivated by pineapple (Goldstein and Udry, 1999). In terms of size, pineapple 
plots tend to be much larger.  The average pineapple plot in the sample is 1 acre, while 
the average non-pineapple plot is only 0.6 acres (Goldstein and Udry, 1999).  
In comparison to maize and cassava farming, pineapple production requires 
significantly more up-front costs. In the dataset, the median cost of production, including 
labor and non-labor inputs, is $202 per acre for pineapple plots compared to $121 per 
acre for non-pineapple plots (Goldstein and Udry, 1999). Labor costs include household 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The data is publicly available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2//ghanadata.html. 
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family labor valued at the local wage, but a much higher percentage of labor on pineapple 
plots is hired.  Pineapple farmers tend to be wealthier, and this could be in part due to 
higher production costs and the need for start-up capital.  For example, the median cost of 
production for pineapple plots represents 60% of GDP per capita in Ghana during the 
study period.  While pineapple farming is more expensive, it is also more profitable.  
Pineapple plots in the dataset yield a median profit of $304 per acre compared to a 
median loss of $23 per acre for non-pineapple plots (Goldstein and Udry, 1999).   
Today, the Akwapim South district is a peri-urban area located just outside of the 
capital city of Accra.  According to the Akwapim South District Analytical Report of the 
2010 Population and Housing Census, over one third of the labor force works in 
agriculture either formally or informally (Opoku-Addo and Abdulai, 2014). Farmers 
continue to grow a variety of crops including maize, cassava, plantain, pepper, and other 
vegetables, and the district is one of the leading producers of pineapples, mangos, and 
citrus fruits in Ghana (Opoku-Addo and Abdulai, 2014).  
Fertilizer Use and Credit 
 
Agronomy studies find that fertilizer use is an important determinant of pineapple 
productivity. Pineapple has a large nutrient demand that usually exceeds the nutrients 
supplied in the soil, especially nitrogen (Souza, 2005).  Fertilizer trials in Kenya have 
shown that nitrogenous fertilizer contributes to greater fruit size growth and stronger 
plant foliage (Kayitesi, 2011), and trials in Nigeria have shown that additional nitrogen 
increases pineapple yields (Omotoso, 2013). In Southern Ghana, Abutiate and Eyeson 
(1973) find that nitrogen in soils is generally low, and pineapple yields and fruit weight 
increases with added nitrogen and potassium. 
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However, many pineapple farmers do not use fertilizer, use inadequate amounts 
of fertilizer, or conduct fertilizer application at a less than opportune time. In Benin, 
Hotegni et. al (2010) finds that no specific fertilizer application regime exists, and due to 
high costs, pineapple farmers apply fertilizer inconsistently depending on whether they 
can afford it at the time. The study shows that heterogeneous fertilizer application 
practices, including the timing and number of applications, greatly influences the quality 
of pineapple production in Benin.  Kayitesi (2011) finds that, in Rwanda, most farmers 
apply less than adequate fertilizer amounts because manure from their livestock is not 
enough and inorganic fertilizer is too expensive.  The study also states that incorrect 
timing of fertilizer application leads to poorer yields.   
In 2016, I completed a qualitative independent study2 interviewing six 
smallholder pineapple farmers in the Akwapim South district. Respondents were sampled 
purposively through announcements at a Village Savings and Loan Association.  Half of 
the farmers I interviewed reported that their biggest challenge as a pineapple farmer is 
accessing credit to purchase inputs, and all farmers reported a lack of access to credit 
(Timerman, 2016). Goldstein and Udry (1999) also state that the most reported 
challenges for farmers in this region include increased financial demands and maintaining 
soil fertility.  Gyimah (2015) surveys 49 pineapple farmers in the Akwapim South district 
and finds similar results.  The study shows that a lack of access to credit is the number 
one reported constraint by farmers, followed by low fruit price and high fertilizer price or 
inaccessibility.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I completed this study at Ashesi University College under the direction of Dr. Stephen Armah. 	  
7 
Of the three farmers I interviewed that reported a lack of credit, all of these 
farmers also stated that insufficient liquidity causes them to apply inputs at the wrong 
time. One farmer attempts to time his harvest when pineapples are scarce and prices are 
higher, but this strategy relies on proper timing of fertilizer application to delay fruiting 
(Timerman, 2016).  Without liquidity at the right time, his strategy fails.  Proper timing 
of credit could potentially increase input use, leading to higher production and incomes 
for smallholder horticulture farmers in this region. This study focuses on the first step: 
the effect of credit timing on fertilizer use.  
Risk and Pineapple Production  
 Goldstein and Udry also collected data on shocks suffered by pineapple plots and 
other crops. They find no empirical evidence that pineapple farming faces a greater 
probability of loss than any other crop, but the magnitude of loss is greater (Goldstein and 
Udry, 1999). In the first year of the survey, 15% of plots suffered a shock, but pineapple 
plots were slightly less likely to suffer a shock.  In terms of losses, farmers lost an 
average of $405 per acre from shocks to pineapple plots compared to an average of $81 
per acre for other plots (Goldstein and Udry, 1999).  Possibly, some farmers choose not 
to cultivate pineapple because of the added magnitude of risk, but the effect of this risk 
on farmers’ decisions to purchase fertilizer, once they have decided to grow pineapple, is 
less clear.  According to Conley and Udry (2010), the average fertilizer expenditure for 
pineapple in this dataset is $40 per acre, while the median total cost of production is $202 
per acre (Goldstein and Udry, 1999).  Using these statistics, average fertilizer expenditure 
represents about 20% of total cost.  Given that fertilizer use increases production, the 
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relatively small cost of fertilizer seems to pose little added risk. Unfortunately, my study 
does not control for risk preferences because the data structure is cross-sectional.   
III. Literature Review: Time Inconsistency and Credit Constraints  
 The economic literature proposes several reasons for farmers’ lack of fertilizer 
use, including risk aversion, high transaction costs, high learning costs, time-inconsistent 
behavior, and credit constraints.  I focus on the last two reasons: time-inconsistency and 
credit constraints.  Farmers with time-inconsistent behavior underestimate their ability to 
save for future expenses on agriculture inputs (Duflo et. al, 2011).  In other words, 
farmers plan to save revenue from their harvest in order to buy inputs later in the season, 
but they fail to follow through on these plans.  Credit constraints affect farmers’ ability to 
purchase fertilizer if they lack liquidity and cannot borrow.  I divide the following 
literature review into two sections: (1) Literature that considers the effects of timing but 
not the effects of credit and (2) Literature that considers the effects of credit but not the 
effects of timing. My study contributes to the literature by analyzing both timing and 
credit aspects.   
Section (1): Literature that considers timing effects but not credit effects 
 Several studies find that farmers’ behavior regarding fertilizer purchases is 
significantly affected by cash flow, which changes based on the time of season.  Farmers 
have more liquidity right after harvest and less liquidity at planting time.  Pineapple 
farmers wait three to six months after harvest before planting in order for the pineapple 
plants to regrow for replanting (Gatune et. al, 2013). During this three to six month 
period, farmers may spend their revenue from harvest on household consumption needs 
instead of saving revenue for input purchases later in the season. The following reviewed 
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studies analyze the effects of timing for agriculture seasons where the time between 
harvesting and planting ranges from two to six months for maize (Duflo et. al, 2011; 
Holden and Lunduka, 2013) and three months for tobacco (Brune et. al, 2015).  
Duflo et. al (2011) conducts a control randomized trial of a fertilizer delivery 
program in Western Kenya. The free delivery provides farmers a small, time-sensitive 
discount. Offering this discount directly after harvest increases fertilizer use by 11.4 to 
14.3%, depending on control variables included, and this effect is similar to offering a 
50% subsidy just before planting.  The study design eliminates concerns of credit 
constraints because farmers can pay for fertilizer with maize from their harvest.  Duflo 
hypothesizes that the smaller discount after harvest is just as effective as a larger discount 
at planting time because farmers are time-inconsistent.   
Holden and Lunduka (2013) analyze the willingness of farmers in Malawi to pay 
for fertilizer at various times in the season. The study shows that on average, households 
are willing to allocate 45% of a hypothetical cash budget for fertilizer at harvest time, 
compared to 60% of the budget at planting time.  Both Duflo et. al (2011) and Holden 
and Lunduka (2013)  find that farmers are willing to pay more for fertilizer at planting 
time.  These results suggest that the timing of credit would affect fertilizer use, especially 
for time-inconsistent farmers.   
Furthermore, studies show that discount rates are generally high in developing 
economies (Lunduka and Holden, 2013).  This means that money today is much more 
valuable than money received tomorrow. High discount rates contribute to farmers’ 
inability to save for fertilizer or buy it in advance when they have liquidity after harvest. 
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Descriptive statistics from Duflo et. al (2011) show that 96% of farmers bought fertilizer 
just before use.   
Brune et. al (2015) conducted a control randomized trial of a savings account 
program for farmers. The program offered farmers a savings or commitment savings 
account to help them save money after harvest for input purchases during planting 
season.  The effect of being offered a savings account or a commitment savings account 
increased input expenditure by 13.3% compared to the control group. Furthermore, the 
commitment savings treatment had almost a 50% greater effect on input expenditure than 
simply the savings treatment.  The authors hypothesize that several mechanisms could be 
causing these results. For example, savings accounts could make farmers more eligible 
for loans or act as a psychological commitment device.  Farmers may intend to use 
fertilizer, but they may need assistance to follow through on their plans.  For example, 
Duflo et. al (2011) finds that, after a training session on fertilizer, 97.7% of farmers stated 
they planned to use fertilizer, but only two-thirds of farmers actually did.  The results of 
Brune et. al (2015) suggest that increased liquidity at planting time, through commitment 
savings accounts, increases input expenditure. This finding indirectly suggests that credit 
at planting time would increase input expenditure more than credit at other times because 
credit also increases liquidity.  
Section (2): Literature that considers credit effects but not timing effects 
Many studies find that access to credit increases fertilizer use or adoption of 
technology, but they do not take into account the timing of credit.  The economic 
literature measures credit in a variety of ways.  Croppenstedlt et. al (2003) measures 
credit access in Ethiopia by the percentage of households in a farmer’s village that have 
11 
access to credit through a local peasant association.  The study finds that a one percent 
increase in credit access increases the probability of fertilizer use by 0.76%. Abudulai 
and Huffman (2005), on the other hand, classifies farmers in Tanzania as credit 
constrained if they want more credit, their request for credit is rejected, or no informal or 
formal lenders exist. The study finds that credit non-constrained farmers are more likely 
on average to adopt the technology of cross-bred cows.  However, Abdulai and Huffman 
(2005) find that farmers mostly used credit to purchase cross-bred cows, so potential 
endogeneity make these conclusions weaker. Both Croppenstedlt et. al (2003) and 
Abdulai and Huffman (2005) use cross-sectional data, and the ability to prove a causal 
mechanism is limited because of the inability to control for unobservable heterogeneity 
like entrepreneurial spirit.   
Other studies attempt to account for unobserved heterogeneity by using 
propensity-score matching or panel data.  Abate et. al (2016) measures credit access in 
Ethiopia as receiving credit from a farmers’ association in a given production year.  The 
study uses propensity score matching with cross-sectional data to compare borrowers to 
farmers without access to financial services.  Results show that households with credit 
access are 11% more likely to use fertilizer and 32% more likely to use improved seeds. 
Households with credit access had significantly more education, lived closer to 
microfinance institutions and farmer schools, and were male-headed varied. Moser and 
Barret (2006) construct a seven-year panel with recall data from a cross-sectional survey, 
which allows for controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity.  The study measures 
liquidity using a dummy variable for stable income and a continuous variable for total 
land cultivated with rice, which is a proxy for wealth. The results show that wealth and a 
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stable source of income significantly and positively affect the probability of adopting the 
technology of a System of Rice Intensification in Madagascar.  Liverpool and Nelson 
(2009) measure credit access as having taken a loan from a micro-finance institution, and 
use actual panel data to assess how the effect of credit differs by asset wealth for farmers 
in Ethiopia.  The study finds that for always or transitory asset poor households, credit 
access had no significant effect on the probability of fertilizer use or pesticide use.   
My study contributes to the literature by analyzing the effect of the timing of 
credit and exactly how much farmers borrowed.  Other studies only measure if farmers 
borrowed or if they had access to credit or liquidity via some proxy variable.  Most of the 
loans assessed in this study are informal loans taken from friends and family, while the 
literature tends to focus on formal microfinance. In comparison to formal loans, informal 
lenders face less asymmetric information problems because they know their borrowers, 
and informal lenders often require less collateral (Guikinger and Boucher, 2008).  
Furthermore, I explore the effect of credit in horticultural production, while most studies 
analyze staple crops such as maize or rice.  This study also suffers from endogeniety and 
omitted variable problems inherent in cross-sectional data. However, examining the 
effect of timing provides a stronger causal mechanism than simply looking at credit 
access because the data is disaggregated to a more granular level.  
IV. Theory: The agricultural household model with a credit constraint  
I utilize an agricultural household model with a credit constraint to illustrate the 
positive effect of borrowing on fertilizer use.  Agricultural households represent a unique 
economic unit because households are both producers and consumers of goods.  In the 
case of perfect markets, households first make production decisions to minimize costs 
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[1] 	  
[2]
[3] 	  
and then make consumption decisions to maximize utility.  However, in the face of 
market failure, household production and consumption decisions are inseparable or made 
simultaneously (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2016).  My theory examines the case of credit 
market failure, while assuming all other markets are perfect. The household agricultural 
model shows that a lack of credit access at the beginning of the production cycle 
decreases farm investment because fertilizer use is constrained by household’s ability to 
borrow.  
I base my theory of off the work of Damon (2008) and Postolovska (2010).  The 
agricultural household maximizes utility [1] as a function of consumption and leisure, 
across time periods 1 and 2, and z represents household specific factors.  Households 
maximize utility subject to a time constraint [2, 3], a consumption constraint [4, 5], and a 
production constraint [6, 7] in each time period. The household’s total time endowment 
equals family labor 𝐹!   and leisure (𝑙!).  In the first time period, consumption equals 
farm revenue minus fertilizer costs plus wage earnings and amount borrowed. Wage 
earnings are determined by the market wage (𝑤) times the amount of hours worked on 
the wage market, which equals family labor minus family-farm labor 𝐹! − 𝐿! .  In the 
second time period, consumption plus repayment of the loan equals farm revenue minus 
fertilizer costs and wage earnings.  The production constraint shows that pineapple 
produced is determined by farm labor and fertilizer use.   max𝑈[(𝐶!, 𝑙!; 𝑧)+ 𝛽(𝐶!, 𝑙!; 𝑧)]	  Subject	  to:	  	  𝑇! = 𝐹! + 𝑙! 𝑇! = 𝐹! + 𝑙!	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[4] 	  
[5] 	  
[6] 	  
[7] 	  
[8] 	  
[9] 	  
[10] 	  
[12] 	  
[13] 	  
[14] 	  
[11] 	  
[15] 	  
𝐶! = 𝑝!𝑄! − 𝑝!!𝑋! + 𝑤! 𝐹! − 𝐿! + 𝐵	  𝐶! + 1+ 𝑟 𝐵 = 𝑝!𝑄! − 𝑝!!𝑋! + 𝑤! 𝐹! − 𝐿! 	  𝑄! = 𝑄(𝐿!,𝑋!)	  𝑄! = 𝑄(𝐿!,𝑋!)	  	   The time, consumption, and production constraints are combined into the 
following full income constraints [8, 9] for each time period.  
 𝐶! = 𝑝!𝑄(𝐿!𝑋!)− 𝑝!!𝑋! + 𝑤! 𝑇! − 𝑙! − 𝑤!(𝐿!)+ 𝐵	  𝐶! + 1+ 𝑟 𝐵 = 𝑝!𝑄(𝐿!𝑋!)− 𝑝!!𝑋! + 𝑤! 𝑇! − 𝑙! − 𝑤!𝐿!	  
The Lagrangian maximization problem and first order conditions for the first time 
period are as follows.   ℒ = 
𝑈 𝐶!, 𝑙!; 𝑧 + 𝛽 𝐶!, 𝑙!; 𝑧 − 𝜆! 𝐶! − 𝑝!𝑄 𝐿!,𝑋! − 𝑝!!𝑋! + 𝑤! 𝑇! − 𝑙! −𝑤! 𝐿! + 𝐵− 𝜆![𝐶! + 1+ 𝑟 𝐵 − 𝑝!𝑄 𝐿!,𝑋! − 𝑝!!𝑋! + 𝑤! 𝑇! − 𝑙! − 𝑤!𝐿! ] 
 
!ℒ!!! = !"!!! − 𝜆! = 0 !ℒ!!! = !"!!! − 𝜆!𝑤! = 0 !ℒ!!! = 𝜆!𝑝! !"!!! − 𝜆!𝑤! = 0  !ℒ!!! = 𝜆!𝑝! !"!!! − 𝜆!𝑝!! = 0 !ℒ!!! = −𝐶! + 𝑝!𝑄 𝐿!,𝑋! − 𝑝!!𝑋! + 𝑤! 𝑇! − 𝑙! − 𝑤! 𝐿! + 𝐵 = 0  
15 
[16] 	  
[17] 	  
 As seen in equation [16], the demand for fertilizer depends on the exogenous 
variables of the price of pineapple, the price of fertilizer, the wage, and the amount 
borrowed. Holding all else constant, the derivative of fertilizer with respect to borrowing 
is positive.   𝑋 = (𝑝!,𝑝! ,𝑤,𝐵) 
!"!" > 0 
Simple economic theory proposes that the timing of credit should not affect the 
amount of fertilizer used.  If farmers borrow money before they need fertilizer, they 
should be able to save money until that time. Alternatively, farmers could purchase 
fertilizer and store it because fertilizer is a non-perishable good. I assume that fertilizer 
has a positive return on investment, and this assumption is supported by the literature 
(Gyimah, 2015). Therefore, as long as farmers receive credit before the necessary time 
for fertilizer application, it theoretically should have a positive effect on fertilizer use or 
investment. However, Duflo et. al (2011) shows that farmers struggle to follow through 
on plans to save money for inputs.  My study helps shed light on the difference between 
theory and farmers’ behavior in actuality.   
V. Data Description: Agricultural Innovation and Resource Management in Ghana 
The dataset used for this study is titled “Agricultural Innovation and Resource 
Management in Ghana”. Researchers originally collected the data to understand social 
learning about fertilizer use and the transition to pineapple farming in Southern Ghana 
(Goldstein and Udry, 1999).  The survey consists of 15 rounds of data collected 
approximately six weeks apart, starting in late November of 1996 and ending in early 
August of 1998.  In each round, farmers are asked about their farming activities, input 
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use, and borrowing.  Four village areas were chosen purposively for representing a 
variety of agricultural and economic characteristics (Goldstein and Udry, 1999). Only 
three of the four villages have pineapple farmers.  Married couples were sampled 
randomly from the villages to create the final sample. The entire household roster of the 
survey data includes 221 households with a total of 1,624 individuals.   
I use pineapple plantings as the unit of analysis. In the data, 294 observations of 
pineapple plantings exist, but I drop three observations due to missing data on input use 
and 28 observations due to a lack of household demographic information. About half of 
the plantings lack data for loan amounts received before and after plantings because they 
take place at the beginning and end of the survey.  Omitting these observations decreases 
the sample size to 150 plantings owned by 59 households. Then, I drop 10 observations 
associated with outlier loan values of $1,000, $2,000, and $5,000, and an additional 10 
observations associated with household savings of  $5,000 or values of stored chemicals 
of $3,300.  In short, I omitted 20 plantings associated with five households that are 
wealthier or received very large amounts of loans.  The final sample includes 130 
plantings representing 54 households and 85 plots.  
The observations of plantings are fairly evenly distributed over time because in 
Southern Ghana there is no specific time of year for planting pineapple (Goldstein and 
Udry, 1999).  Table 1 displays the percentage of plantings in each round.  Round 10 has 
the largest percentage of plantings with 16.15% and Round 5 has the smallest with 
8.46%.  
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VI. Empirical Model and Strategy 
The timing of loans is analyzed in terms of before, during, and after the first 
necessary time to apply fertilizer in the pineapple production cycle. The agronomy 
literature on pineapple production unanimously recommends fertilizer be applied within 
the first three months after planting, and one to two more times within nine months after 
planting. (Abutiate and Eyeson, 1973; Souza, 2005; Omotoso, 2013).  Timing is 
measured in terms of periods of the survey data. Time zero 𝑡!   is marked as the survey 
period in which pineapple is planted. The necessary first time to apply fertilizer is 
designated as during the period of planting or within two periods after the period of 
planting, 𝑡! − 𝑡! . The dependent variable, fertilizer use (𝑦!,!!  !  !!), represents a 
continuous variable for the amount of fertilizer applied during this time  or a dummy 
variable for fertilizer use during this time.   
First, I specify a completely aggregated model without including the effect of 
timing. This model provides a comparison with other models that do account for timing. 
The dependent variable of interest is the total amount of credit received over all time 
periods (𝑡!! − 𝑡!!). The letter V represents a vector of control variables, including 
household socio-economic characteristics and village.  Household demographic variables 
include household size, age of the household head, and education of the household head, 
which are controlled for in accordance with other studies (Croppenstedlt et. al, 2003; 
Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Abate et. al, 2016). 
Aggregated timing model:  𝑦!,!!!!! =   𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%!!!!  !!!! +𝛽!𝑉! + 𝜀! 
18 
In the simple timing model below, receiving credit is counted as ‘before’ the 
necessary time period of fertilizer application if it is received within two periods before 
the period of planting 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%"!!!  !  !!! , and receiving credit is counted as ‘after’ 
the necessary time period of fertilizer application if it is received the third or fourth 
period after planting 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%!!  !  !! . The variables 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%"!!!!!!! , 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%&!!!!! , and 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%!!!!!  are estimated as continuous variables for the 
amount of credit received3. The effect of credit before (𝛽!)  and during (𝛽!)  is 
hypothesized to be positive, while the effect of credit after (𝛽!)  is hypothesized to be not 
significant.   
Simple timing model:  𝑦!,!!!!! =   𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%"!!!  !  !!! + 𝛽! 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%&!!  !  !!+ 𝛽! 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"#$%!!  !  !! + 𝛽!𝑉! + 𝜀! 
A third specification is conducted using disaggregated specifications for time 
where C stands for Credit. The disaggregated specification further explores the effect of 
the granularity of timing.   
 Disaggregated timing model:  
𝑦! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!!! 𝐶!!   !!!!!!! + 𝛽!𝑉! + 𝜀! 
In terms of empirical strategy, I first use a Probit model to estimate the effect of 
credit on the probability of using fertilizer during the time period of interest. The 
dependent variable for the Probit model equals one if the planting is fertilized during the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  I also tested specifications using loan dummy variables for each time period, but none were significant.	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timeframe of interest and equals zero if it not.  Secondly, I use Tobit and OLS models to 
estimate the effect of credit on the amount of fertilizer used.  I measure fertilizer use by 
mini bags per 10,000 pineapple plants or suckers. A pineapple plant is called a sucker, 
and one sucker produces one pineapple. The average number of suckers per planting is 
7,250 suckers, which represents about one third of an acre.  The distribution of fertilizer 
use heavily skews right because 71% of plantings never received fertilizer at this time. 
I take the inverse hyperbolic sine4 of fertilizer amount in order to transform the 
distribution to have a smaller range. This technique is similar to a logarithmic 
transformation, but it allows for zero values (Burbidge et. al, 1998; Bellemare et. al, 
2013). I use a Tobit model to account for the the highly skewed distribution of the 
dependent variable. However, a Tobit model is not ideal for this data because the zero 
values are not artificially or randomly censored at zero; they are observed zero values.  
The OLS model is also not ideal due to the skewed distribution, even with the inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation.  As seen in the residual plot in Figure B, the errors of this 
model are highly systematic for observations with a dependent variable equal to zero.  
VII. Summary Statistics: Initial exploration of credit timing and fertilizer use 
 Initial summary statistics suggest that plantings associated with credit during the 
designated important time to apply fertilizer are more likely to receive fertilizer at this 
time.  As seen in Table 2, 32.2% of plantings associated with credit during the important 
time to receive fertilizer actually received fertilizer, while only 28.2% of plantings 
associated with credit before and 27.2% of plantings associated with credit after received 
fertilizer.  Additionally, Table 3 shows that, of plantings that received fertilizer at this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Inverse  Hyperbolic  Sine  of  X = log  (X + 𝑋! + 1) 
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time, 76.3% of plots are associated with credit during this time, compared to 66.3% of 
plots that did not receiver fertilizer. However, according to t-tests, neither the percent of 
plantings receiving fertilizer or the percent of plantings associated with credit are 
statistically different by credit or fertilizer status respectively.  
Summary statistics also suggest that receiving a greater amount of credit in the 
‘during’ period increases the likelihood of applying fertilizer. Table 4 shows that 
plantings that received fertilizer at the time of interest are associated with an average 
value of $67.49 in loans at this time, compared to an average of $26.09 for plantings that 
were not fertilized. A t-test shows that credit amounts associated with plantings in the 
‘during’ period (𝑡! − 𝑡!) are statically different by fertilizer status.  The next sections 
explain summary statistics in depth for the main variables of interest and household 
demographic characteristics that are included as control variables. 
Fertilizer use:  
 In the final sample, 55.38% of plantings ever received fertilizer, but only 29% of 
plantings received fertilizer during the important first window for application. Therefore, 
less than half of the plantings that were fertilized did not get fertilizer within the first two 
periods after planting.  I hypothesize that liquidity constraints are preventing farmers 
from applying fertilizer earlier.  In terms of fertilizer amount, the average unit applied is 
0.53 with a standard deviation of 0.97.  Specifications using fertilizer amount have two 
less observations because two plantings in the data lacked the number of suckers.  
Loans:  
According to Goldstein and Udry (1999) credit markets are surprisingly active 
and well integrated into larger markets in the study area. Of the 54 households in my 
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sample, only 4 households never take a loan. On average, a household has 57 days to pay 
back a loan, but this data only exists for 46 households.  The days to pay back the average 
loan by household vary widely from 8 to 533 days, with a standard deviation of 78 days.   
I specify loans as a continuous variable for the amount received in a given time 
period5. Table 6 shows the fairly even distribution of loan amounts in US dollars for each 
time period. The average credit amount ranges from $20.80 in the ‘after’ time period to 
$35.70 in the ‘before’ period and $38.20 in the ‘during’ time period.  Loans are also 
distributed fairly evenly over time. The percent of plantings associated with loans in the 
‘before’ period is 50%, compared with 69% and 50% in the ‘during’ and ‘after’ periods 
respectively. I also control for loan frequency, which represents the number of time 
periods in which a household took a loan.  There are six time periods, so the variable for 
loan frequency ranges from 0 to 6.  The average loan frequency is 2.82 with a standard 
deviation of 1.93.  
The data provides farmers’ responses to the survey question, “What will you use 
the loan for?” Most households did not take loans for farming purposes, but listed other 
reasons such as trading, medical needs, school fees, funerals, and travel.  Graph A shows 
that the percentage of loans taken for farming purposes is also evenly distributed over 
time, which suggests that farmers are not consistently or uniformly taking loans for 
farming purposes at a specific stage in the pineapple production cycle.  The percentage is 
given in terms of the number of loans taken in each period. 
Household demographic characteristics:  
The final sample includes 54 households. I first present demographic statistics by 
comparing households that ever applied fertilizer during the first important time or not.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I also tested specifications for loans as dummy variables, but none were significant. 
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As seen in Table 8, households that ever applied fertilizer have on average greater 
savings and a greater value of assets and stored chemicals.   However, the average 
savings and value of assets are not statistically different by household fertilizer status.  
This means that households that apply fertilizer may not actually differ on average from 
households that do not apply fertilizer, but the small sample size makes finding statistical 
difference challenging.  
In contrast, the trend changes slightly when comparing demographic 
characteristics by plantings that received fertilizer in the first important window or not. 
Table 8 shows that plantings that received fertilizer are associated with households with a 
slightly lesser value of assets but still greater savings and a greater value of stored 
chemicals. Most demographic characteristics fail to be statistically different by fertilizer 
status, but this could again be due to the small sample.   
Overall, the average household in the sample has a size of about 8 people. The 
average head of household is about 40 years of age and with an average of four years of 
education.  The average household savings is $77.68 and the average value of assets is 
$845.83.  
VIII. Results and Discussion:  
 Results for the completely aggregated timing model show that aggregated credit 
has no effect on fertilizer use. As seen in Table 8, when credit is defined as total credit 
received over time, it appears to have no significant influence on fertilizer use.  However, 
the simple timing model and disaggregated timing model show that credit during the 
important period significantly increases fertilizer use and the probability of fertilizer use.  
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This contrast supports my claim that assessing the effect of credit by including timing 
proves to be important.  
Table 9 displays the results of the simple timing model with credit amount before, 
during, and after. Marginal effects of the Probit model (Figure C) suggest than an 
additional dollar of credit during the first crucial time to apply fertilizer increases the 
probability of fertilizer use at this time by 0.138%. The average loan amount in the 
‘during’ period is about $40, and interestingly, the average expenditure on fertilizer for 
pineapple production is $40 per acre (Conley and Udry, 2010). If a planting is associated 
with a loan increase of $40 or $100 in the ‘during’ period, results suggest the probability 
of fertilizer use increases by 5.52% or 13.8% respectively.  Results of the disaggregated 
Probit model in Table 10 (Figure D) support the results of the simple timing model. The 
regression shows that an additional dollar increase in credit in period 𝑡! increases the 
probability of fertilizer use by 0.158%, significant at the 10% level.   
In terms of fertilizer amount, results of the Tobit model in Table 9 (Figure E) 
suggest that a $1 increase in loans in the ‘during’ period increases fertilizer amount by 
0.80%, or a $40 increase in loans increases fertilizer amount by 32%.   The OLS model 
finds a similar, but smaller effect with a loan increase of one dollar increasing fertilizer 
amount by 0.26% or a $40 loan increasing fertilizer amount by 10.4%.  Both Tobit and 
OLS models find significant coefficients on credit ‘during’ at the 5% level6.  In terms of 
the disaggregated models in Table 10 (Figure F), results are only significant at the 10% 
level. The Tobit regression suggests that a one-dollar increase in credit in period 𝑡! 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  When the specification of credit in the ‘during’ period is redefined to include time period 𝑡!!, credit in 
the ‘during’ period no longer significantly affects fertilizer use.    
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increases fertilizer amount by 1.6%, while the OLS regression suggests a much smaller 
0.51% increase.  
Interestingly, the sign on credit received in the ‘before’ period is negative, 
although not significant, in all simple timing models.  In the disaggregated models, the 
coefficient on 𝑡!!is also consistently negative. Specifically, results suggest that an 
additional dollar of credit decreases the probability of fertilizer use by 0.47% and the 
amount of fertilizer by 3.23%, significant at the 10% level.  Increased liquidity before the 
important time to apply fertilizer may not positively affect fertilizer use due to high 
discount rates commonly found in developing economies.  However, the fact that credit 
in the ‘before’ period is negatively associated with fertilizer is surprising. Perhaps 
households that take a loan one time period before planting cannot take an additional loan 
during planting time, which negatively affects fertilizer use.  
Robustness check: Clustered standard errors by household 
Clustered standard errors are used to adjust for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
household level, especially because households own multiple plantings.  There are 55 
households in the sample, and households own 5.8 plantings on average. The results of 
the Probit and OLS specifications with clustered errors are shown in Column (2) and (4) 
of Tables 9 and 10 (Figures D and F).  Standard errors cannot be clustered in the Tobit 
model. For the simple timing model, clustered standard errors decrease the significance 
of credit in the ‘during’ period in the Probit model, but increase its significance in the 
OLS model.  In the disaggregated timing model, clustered standard errors increase the 
significance of credit in periods: 𝑡!!, 𝑡!, and 𝑡!.  Clustered errors also make previously 
insignificant coefficients now significant. These coefficients include credit in period 𝑡! in 
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the Probit model and credit in periods 𝑡!! and 𝑡! in the OLS model. The signs of these 
now significant variables are in accordance with the original results.  
Robustness check: Including dropped outliers 
 I conduct a robustness check including 10 outliers with household savings or 
values of stored chemicals $3,000 or $5,000.  The results with dropped outliers are 
displayed in Tables 11 and 12 (Figures G – J).  Compared to the original simple timing 
model, the effect of credit during the important time to apply fertilizer remains at the 
same level of significance but has a greater magnitude. Specifically, an additional dollar 
of credit in the ‘during’ period increases the probability of fertilizer use by 0.149% 
compared to 0.138% in the original model. The Tobit model suggests that an additional 
dollar of credit increases the amount of fertilizer by 0.879% compared to 0.797% in the 
original model.  In the disaggregated model, including outliers causes the coefficient on 
credit in period 𝑡!!to no longer be significant, but the sign is still negative. In the Probit 
and OLS models, credit in period 𝑡!  remains significant but has a greater magnitude, and 
in the Tobit model, credit in period 𝑡!remains significant but has a lesser magnitude. 
Although results vary slightly from the primary findings, the argument that credit during 
the important window to apply fertilizer significantly increases fertilizer use still holds 
when including outliers.  
IX. Limitations:  
The conclusions of this study are limited by cross-sectional data that prohibit 
controlling for heterogeneous time invariant unobservable factors such as entrepreneurial 
spirit.  For example, perhaps farmers that take loans during the important time to apply 
fertilizer are also more entrepreneurial on average.  Then, my analysis could have 
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incorrectly attributed increase in fertilizer use to the timing of loans, when in fact the 
increase in fertilizer use is actually due to farmers’ entrepreneurial aptitude. The effect of 
credit on fertilizer use could be insignificant or much more diminished after accounting 
for unobserved factors such as entrepreneurialism. The best data would allow for 
observing fertilizer use during the important first window for application both before and 
after randomized dispersal of credit.  
Other potential omitted variable biases exist as well. Variables such as off-farm 
income and gifts received at the household level were not controlled for because the 
survey did not include these variables for each time period.  The effect of this bias is 
unknown. Controlling for these variables could diminish the effect or significance of 
credit because off-farm income and gifts represent other sources of liquidity that could 
increase fertilizer use, making credit less influential.  However, controlling for these 
variables could increase the effect of credit if off-farm income and gifts are regular 
sources of household income that do not affect the expenditure constraint on farm inputs.  
The study is also limited by potential endogeneity. For example, farmers may plan 
when to take credit based on when they plan to apply fertilizer, which means that the 
timing of fertilizer could also affect the timing of credit.  However, during the important 
time to apply fertilizer, the percentage of loans reported for specifically farming purposes 
ranges from only 10% to 17% depending on time period. A randomized control trial 
would be needed to erase concerns of endogeneity. It is possible that without problems of 
endogeniety and omitted variables there would be no effect of credit timing because the 
truly causal factors are being controlled for in the regression. While the findings of this 
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study are limited by the data, the results are supported by similar findings in the 
literature.  
X. Conclusion:  
I find that credit during the important first time to apply fertilizer in the pineapple 
production cycle significantly affects fertilizer use at this time.  This conclusion supports 
the findings of other studies, including Croppenstedlt et. al (2003), Abdulai and Huffman 
(2005), and Abate et. al (2016), that state credit access or being non-liquidity constrained 
is associated with higher fertilizer use or technology adoption. Results also suggest that 
credit received just before the first window for fertilizer application decreases the 
probability and amount of fertilizer at this time.  My findings are constrained by 
observational data and further studies should randomize the variables of credit overtime. 
The literature currently lacks randomized control trials assessing horticultural production, 
which especially relies on the correct timing of inputs. Although credit plays an important 
factor, it should not be seen as a silver bullet to improving fertilizer use. Farmers may not 
have the knowledge to use fertilizer effectively or traveling to buy fertilizer may be 
infeasible or incredibly time consuming. 
Future studies should also assess the effect of credit on fertilizer use among 
women.  Men significantly dominate pineapple farming and tend to have greater access to 
credit.  According to Goldstein and Udry (1999), 90% of plots cultivated by women in 
the survey grow cassava and maize, and women’s plots receive less fertilizer on average. 
Furthermore, men in the dataset borrowed a median amount of $50, while women only 
borrowed a median amount of $20.   
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 In conclusion, programs aimed at supporting farmers with credit should consider 
offering loans during agronomically important times for input use in the production cycle 
in order to maximize the effect of credit.  Pineapple farmers plant at varied times 
throughout the year, so this important time could be different for every farmer, and credit 
programs would require a degree of flexibility and adaptability.  This study shows that 
accounting for the effect of timing proves to be important when analyzing the impact of 
credit on fertilizer use.  
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Figure C: 
 
 
 
Figure D:  
 
Note: For coefficient plots, the thick line represents the 90% confidence interval and the thin line represents 
the 95% confidence interval 
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Figure E 
 
 
Figure F 
 
 
Note: For coefficient plots, the thick line represents the 90% confidence interval and the thin line represents 
the 95% confidence interval 
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Figure G:  
Robustness Check – Including Dropped Outliers 
 
 
Figure H: 
Robustness Check – Including Dropped Outliers 
 
Note: For coefficient plots, the thick line represents the 90% confidence interval and the thin line represents 
the 95% confidence interval 
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Figure I 
Robustness Check – Including Dropped Outliers 
 
 
Figure J 
Robustness Check – Including Dropped Outliers 
 
 
Note: For coefficient plots, the thick line represents the 90% confidence interval and the thin line represents 
the 95% confidence interval 
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Tables: 
Table 1: Percent of Plantings by Survey Round 
Survey 
Round 
Number of 
Plantings Percent 
4 14 10.77 
5 11 8.46 
6 18 13.85 
7 18 13.85 
8 17 13.08 
9 15 11.54 
10 21 16.15 
11 16 12.31 
Total 130 100 
 
 
 
Table 2: Percent of plantings receiving fertilizer by credit timing association 
Credit timing  Number of plantings 
associated with 
credit timing 
Percent of plantings that 
received fertilizer at the 
first important time period 
(St. dev) 
Difference 
Credit Before 78 0.282 
(0.452) 
0.026 
(0.082) 
Credit During  90 0.322 
(0.470) 
0.097 
(0.087) 
Credit After 66 0.272 
(0.449) 
0.040 
(0.080) 
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Table 3: Percent of plantings associated with credit by fertilizer status  
Credit Status Planting 
fertilized at the 
first important 
time period 
Planting NOT 
fertilized at the 
first important 
time period 
Difference 
(St. dev) 
Percent of 
plantings 
associated with 
Credit Before 
(St. dev) 
0.579 
(0.500) 
0.609 
(0.491) 
0.030 
(0.095) 
Percent of 
plantings 
associated with 
Credit During 
(St. dev) 
0.763 
(0.431) 
0.663 
(0.475) 
0.100 
(0.089) 
Percent of 
plantings 
associated with 
Credit After 
(St. dev) 
0.474 
(0.506) 
0.521 
(0.502) 
0.048 
(0.097) 
Number of 
Plantings 
38 92  
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Table 4: Mean credit by fertilizer status 
Credit Status Planting 
fertilized at the 
first important 
time period 
Planting NOT 
fertilized at the 
first important 
time period 
Difference 
(St. dev) 
Mean amount of 
Credit Before 
associated with 
plantings 
(St. dev) 
$27.21 
(62.33) 
$39.21 
(82.35) 
$12.00 
(14.87) 
Mean amount of 
Credit During 
associated with 
plantings 
(St. dev) 
$67.49 
(98.79) 
$26.09 
(61.71) 
$41.40** 
(14.34) 
Mean amount of 
Credit After 
associated with 
plantings 
(St. dev) 
$24.70 
(49.47) 
$19.19 
(43.48) 
$5.51 
(8.73) 
Number of 
Plantings 
38 92  
           ** Significant at 5% level 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics 
Variable (unit) N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fertilizer:       
Apply Fertilizer (=1) 130 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Fertilizer (mini bags) 128 0.53 0.97 0.00 4.20 
Credit over time:       
Credit before (=1) 130 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Credit during (=1) 130 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Credit after (=1) 130 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Credit t-2 (=1) 130 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Credit t-1 (=1) 130 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Credit t0 (=1) 130 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Credit t1 (=1) 130 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Credit t2 (=1) 130 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Credit t3 (=1) 130 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Credit t4 (=1) 130 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Credit amounts:       
Credit before ($) 130 35.70 76.99 0 382.5 
Credit during ($) 130 38.20 76.44 0 457.5 
Credit after ($) 130 20.80 45.19 0 212 
Credit t-2 ($) 130 20.25 54.21 0 350 
Credit t-1 ($) 130 15.45 41.11 0 207.5 
Credit t0 ($) 130 9.96 37.11 0 350 
Credit t1 ($) 130 15.68 45.91 0 350 
Credit t2($) 130 12.55 32.47 0 207.5 
Credit t3 ($) 130 12.12 34.77 0 207.5 
Credit t4 ($) 130 8.68 25.40 0 182.5 
Household demographics:       
HH size (People) 130 7.68 3.42 2 19 
Education HH Head 
(Years) 130 4.03 2.32 0 10 
Age HH Head (Years) 130 39.37 8.96 24 66 
HH savings ($) 130 77.48 130.39 0 750 
HH stored chemicals ($) 130 69.62 104.84 0 465 
HH value of assets ($) 130 845.83 1108.25 0 5965.25 
Village 1 (=1) 130 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Village 2 (=1) 130 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Loan frequency 130 2.82 1.93 0 7 
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Table 6: Comparative demographic statistics by household fertilizer status 
 
Households that 
EVER applied 
fertilizer at the 
important first 
time 
N = 23 
Households 
that NEVER 
applied 
fertilizer at the 
important first 
time 
N = 31 
 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Diff 
HH size  7.6 3.3 6.6 3.5 0.96 
Education 
HH Head 
(Years) 
3.8 2.4 3.9 2.5 0.12 
Age HH 
Head 
(Years) 
40.8 10.7 37.9 9.5 2.96 
HH savings 
($) 100.2 175.1 46.6 93.8 53.63 
HH stored 
chemicals 
($) 
87.7 117.2 30.3 52.7 57.42** 
HH value 
of assets 
($) 
874.5 1235.8 764.6 1251.7 109.99 
Village 1 
(=1) 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.16 
Village 2 
(=1) 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.19 
     ** Significant at 5% level 
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Table 7: Comparative demographics statistics by planting fertilizer status 
 
Plantings that 
received 
fertilizer at the 
important first 
time 
N = 49 
Plantings did 
NOT receive 
fertilizer at the 
important first 
time 
N = 115 
 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Diff 
HH size  8.1 3.0 7.5 3.6 0.59 
Education 
HH Head 
(Years) 3.7 2.0 4.2 2.5 
0.45 
Age HH 
Head 
(Years) 40.4 9.5 39.0 8.8 
1.41 
HH savings 
($) 89.6 149.1 72.5 122.4 17.3 
HH stored 
chemicals 
($) 96.8 118.9 58.4 96.9 
38.45* 
HH value 
of assets 
($) 804.5 993.2 862.9 1157.2 
58.36 
Village 1 
(=1) 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.02 
Village 2 
(=1) 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.11 
     * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 8  
Aggregated timing model: Fertilizer Use ~ Loan Amount 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Probit1 Tobit OLS 
    
Credit Total ($) 0.00043 0.00306 0.00102 
 (0.00035) (0.00241) (0.00081) 
HH size  -0.00496 -0.11469 -0.06635* 
 (0.01593) (0.10976) (0.03554) 
Education HH Head -0.02438 -0.19036 -0.05905 
 (0.01908) (0.13619) (0.03810) 
Age HH Head -0.00076 0.02294 0.02031 
 (0.00625) (0.04285) (0.01339) 
HH savings  0.00012 0.00105 -0.00001 
 (0.00034) (0.00236) (0.00074) 
HH stored chemicals 0.00078* 0.00411 0.00082 
 (0.00042) (0.00301) (0.00098) 
HH value of assets -0.00006 -0.00034 -0.00008 
 (0.00005) (0.00035) (0.00009) 
Village 1 -0.02036 -0.36645 -0.25338 
 (0.14248) (0.99191) (0.30927) 
Village 2 -0.18424 -1.51932* -0.47064* 
 (0.12456) (0.89614) (0.26538) 
Loan Frequency -0.02181 -0.16961 -0.05458 
 (0.02699) (0.18884) (0.06001) 
Constant  0.00965 0.71516 
  (2.02060) (0.60404) 
    
Observations 130 128 128 
R-squared   0.09987 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Probit estimates presented as marginal effects 
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Table 9 
Simple timing model: Fertilizer Use ~ Loan Amount 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Probit estimates presented as marginal effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Probit1 Probit: 
Clustered  
Errors 
Tobit OLS OLS: 
Clustered 
Errors 
      
Credit before ($) -0.00068 -0.00068 -0.00464 -0.00102 -0.00102 
 (0.00058) (0.00063) (0.00419) (0.00118) (0.00084) 
Credit during ($) 0.00138*** 0.00138** 0.00797** 0.00262** 0.00262*** 
 (0.00050) (0.00061) (0.00356) (0.00125) (0.00083) 
Credit after ($)  0.00001 0.00001 0.00189 0.00146 0.00146 
 (0.00101) (0.00090) (0.00679) (0.00227) (0.00285) 
HH size  -0.00676 -0.00676 -0.12674 -0.07209** -0.07209* 
 (0.01584) (0.01464) (0.10839) (0.03568) (0.03654) 
Education  -0.02694 -0.02694 -0.21008 -0.06691* -0.06691 
 (0.01849) (0.01845) (0.13375) (0.03773) (0.04418) 
Age -0.00196 -0.00196 0.01573 0.01657 0.01657 
 (0.00604) (0.00724) (0.04170) (0.01328) (0.01683) 
Savings  0.00023 0.00023 0.00181 0.00029 0.00029 
 (0.00033) (0.00029) (0.00229) (0.00074) (0.00057) 
Stored chemicals 0.00075* 0.00075*** 0.00418 0.00081 0.00081 
 (0.00040) (0.00029) (0.00294) (0.00097) (0.00066) 
Value of assets -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00033 -0.00008 -0.00008 
 (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00033) (0.00009) (0.00009) 
Village 1 -0.03889 -0.03889 -0.45290 -0.29479 -0.29479 
 (0.13788) (0.14911) (0.96475) (0.30570) (0.30772) 
Village 2 -0.20703* -0.20703 -1.59883* -0.53975** -0.53975* 
 (0.12170) (0.14446) (0.88286) (0.26321) (0.29770) 
Loan Frequency -0.02760 -0.02760 -0.19472 -0.07660 -0.07660 
 (0.02656) (0.03048) (0.18786) (0.06007) (0.08285) 
Constant   0.61777 1.01033 1.01033 
   (1.97408) (0.61003) (0.65931) 
      
Observations 130 130 128 128 128 
R-squared    0.14123 0.14123 
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Table 10 
Disaggregated timing model: Fertilizer Use ~ Loan Amount 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Probit estimates presented as marginal effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Probit1 Probit1: 
Clustered 
Errors 
Tobit OLS OLS: 
Clustered  
Errors 
Credit t-2 ($) 0.00012 0.00012 0.00052 0.00021 0.00021 
 (0.00073) (0.00059) (0.00503) (0.00169) (0.00126) 
Credit t-1 ($) -0.00473* -0.00473** -0.03233* -0.00317 -0.00317** 
 (0.00253) (0.00220) (0.01827) (0.00234) (0.00128) 
Credit t0 ($) 0.00105 0.00105 0.00419 0.00106 0.00106 
 (0.00120) (0.00086) (0.00683) (0.00261) (0.00180) 
Credit t1 ($) 0.00158* 0.00158** 0.00654 0.00203 0.00203** 
 (0.00095) (0.00062) (0.00526) (0.00204) (0.00099) 
Credit t2 ($) 0.00196 0.00196** 0.01689* 0.00509* 0.00509*** 
 (0.00135) (0.00093) (0.00903) (0.00297) (0.00125) 
Credit t3 ($) 0.00008 0.00008 0.00375 0.00241 0.00241 
 (0.00145) (0.00142) (0.00936) (0.00287) (0.00405) 
Credit t4 ($) 0.00068 0.00068 0.00670 0.00169 0.00169 
 (0.00167) (0.00132) (0.01096) (0.00402) (0.00352) 
HH size  -0.00208 -0.00208 -0.10371 -0.07066* -0.07066* 
 (0.01602) (0.01355) (0.11063) (0.03682) (0.03611) 
Education -0.02485 -0.02485 -0.20705 -0.06653* -0.06653 
 (0.01816) (0.01859) (0.13320) (0.03816) (0.04504) 
Age -0.00381 -0.00381 0.00657 0.01647 0.01647 
 (0.00617) (0.00734) (0.04347) (0.01401) (0.01804) 
Savings  0.00028 0.00028 0.00198 0.00024 0.00024 
 (0.00032) (0.00024) (0.00228) (0.00076) (0.00057) 
Stored chemicals 0.00119** 0.00119*** 0.00689* 0.00084 0.00084 
 (0.00046) (0.00044) (0.00359) (0.00103) (0.00079) 
Value of assets -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00039 -0.00008 -0.00008 
 (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00034) (0.00009) (0.00009) 
Village 1 -0.04520 -0.04520 -0.45809 -0.27949 -0.27949 
 (0.13907) (0.14034) (0.97870) (0.31374) (0.32456) 
Village 2 -0.16437 -0.16437 -1.31238 -0.53259* -0.53259* 
 (0.12397) (0.14664) (0.91038) (0.27120) (0.31561) 
Loan Frequency -0.02552 -0.02552 -0.19015 -0.07760 -0.07760 
 (0.02691) (0.03016) (0.19396) (0.06230) (0.08737) 
Constant   0.60274 0.99212 0.99212 
   (2.06329) (0.64345) (0.68486) 
Observations 130 130 128 128 128 
R-squared    0.15652 0.15652 
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Table 11 
Robustness Check – Including Outliers 
Simple timing model: Fertilizer Use ~ Loan Amount 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Probit estimates presented as marginal effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Probit1 Probit1: 
Clustered 
Errors 
Tobit OLS OLS: 
Clustered 
Errors 
      
Credit before ($) -0.00026 -0.00026 -0.00168 -0.00043 -0.00043 
 (0.00053) (0.00054) (0.00376) (0.00109) (0.00086) 
Credit during ($) 0.00149*** 0.00149*** 0.00879** 0.00266** 0.00266*** 
 (0.00047) (0.00057) (0.00345) (0.00117) (0.00080) 
Credit after ($)  -0.00021 -0.00021 0.00043 0.00108 0.00108 
 (0.00095) (0.00088) (0.00649) (0.00209) (0.00262) 
HH size  -0.01355 -0.01355 -0.16700 -0.07949** -0.07949** 
 (0.01494) (0.01550) (0.10456) (0.03373) (0.03736) 
Education -0.02246 -0.02246 -0.18066 -0.06357* -0.06357 
 (0.01751) (0.01660) (0.12814) (0.03717) (0.04405) 
Age 0.00383 0.00383 0.05142 0.02286* 0.02286 
 (0.00535) (0.00692) (0.03715) (0.01173) (0.01605) 
Savings  0.00006 0.00006 0.00054 0.00020 0.00020* 
 (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00038) (0.00012) (0.00010) 
Stored chemicals -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00030 -0.00004 -0.00004 
 (0.00013) (0.00010) (0.00095) (0.00020) (0.00013) 
Value of assets -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00039 -0.00009 -0.00009 
 (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00032) (0.00009) (0.00009) 
Village 1 0.06740 0.06740 0.21729 -0.17123 -0.17123 
 (0.12114) (0.13678) (0.86416) (0.27162) (0.28607) 
Village 2 -0.13509 -0.13509 -1.11609 -0.47938* -0.47938 
 (0.11388) (0.13818) (0.81251) (0.25287) (0.29762) 
Loan Frequency -0.02017 -0.02017 -0.13932 -0.06501 -0.06501 
 (0.02603) (0.03077) (0.18342) (0.05824) (0.08038) 
Constant   -0.63611 0.79162 0.79162 
   (1.86133) (0.57590) (0.64374) 
Observations 140 140 138 138 138 
R-squared    0.13097 0.13097 
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Table 12: 
Robustness Check – Including Outliers 
Disaggregated timing model: Fertilizer Use ~ Loan Amount 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Probit1 Probit1: 
Clustered 
Errors 
Tobit OLS OLS: 
Clustered 
Errors 
Credit t-2 ($) -0.00010 -0.00010 -0.00114 -0.00050 -0.00050 
 (0.00071) (0.00065) (0.00489) (0.00159) (0.00141) 
Credit t-1 ($) -0.00073 -0.00073 -0.00452 -0.00072 -0.00072 
 (0.00104) (0.00120) (0.00744) (0.00207) (0.00207) 
Credit t0 ($) 0.00048 0.00048 0.00260 0.00054 0.00054 
 (0.00097) (0.00091) (0.00635) (0.00235) (0.00164) 
Credit t1 ($) 0.00200** 0.00200** 0.00887* 0.00245 0.00245** 
 (0.00090) (0.00079) (0.00514) (0.00192) (0.00102) 
Credit t2 ($) 0.00171 0.00171 0.01485* 0.00518* 0.00518*** 
 (0.00115) (0.00119) (0.00783) (0.00281) (0.00137) 
Credit t3 ($) 0.00017 0.00017 0.00283 0.00186 0.00186 
 (0.00118) (0.00109) (0.00798) (0.00254) (0.00357) 
Credit t4 ($) -0.00007 -0.00007 0.00158 0.00090 0.00090 
 (0.00162) (0.00158) (0.01085) (0.00393) (0.00408) 
HH size  -0.01436 -0.01436 -0.17675* -0.08090** -0.08090** 
 (0.01512) (0.01406) (0.10548) (0.03447) (0.03514) 
Education -0.02181 -0.02181 -0.18491 -0.06475* -0.06475 
 (0.01746) (0.01652) (0.12802) (0.03765) (0.04511) 
Age 0.00470 0.00470 0.05726 0.02418** 0.02418 
 (0.00544) (0.00707) (0.03784) (0.01210) (0.01645) 
HH savings  0.00007 0.00007 0.00061 0.00021* 0.00021** 
 (0.00006) (0.00004) (0.00039) (0.00012) (0.00009) 
Stored chemicals 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00023 -0.00004 -0.00004 
 (0.00013) (0.00010) (0.00097) (0.00021) (0.00012) 
Value of assets -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00042 -0.00009 -0.00009 
 (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00033) (0.00009) (0.00009) 
Village 1 0.09005 0.09005 0.35530 -0.15122 -0.15122 
 (0.12212) (0.13391) (0.86977) (0.27673) (0.29281) 
Village 2 -0.11728 -0.11728 -1.05654 -0.47737* -0.47737 
 (0.11598) (0.14286) (0.82690) (0.26095) (0.30443) 
Loan Frequency -0.01539 -0.01539 -0.11668 -0.06076 -0.06076 
 (0.02664) (0.03193) (0.18745) (0.06055) (0.08633) 
Constant   -0.88560 0.72996 0.72996 
   (1.92213) (0.60483) (0.66855) 
Observations 140 140 138 138 138 
R-squared    0.14263 0.14263 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Probit estimates presented as marginal effects 
